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 This thesis analyzes the determinants of change in the doctrine and force structure 
of United States naval forces in Europe from the publication of the Maritime Strategy in 
1986 to the contemporary post-11 September 2001 security environment.  Four factors 
are examined as possible determinants of change: (1) geopolitics, including changes in 
the political and security environment in Europe; (2) inter-service competition for 
resources, influenced by congressionally mandated jointness in military operations; (3) 
the influence of key policy-makers in the United States political and military command 
structure, including the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, and elected officials of 
both the executive and the legislative branches; and (4) relations between the United 
States and its NATO Allies.  The thesis concludes that certain factors were more 
influential than others in specific circumstances, but all contributed to shaping doctrine 
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The United States Navy played important roles in European security throughout 
the Cold War, and it continues to do so today.  The role of naval forces in European 
security is frequently undervalued and has comparatively rarely been the subject of 
detailed study.  This is because European historians and strategists tend to be continental 
oriented.  In most European countries, analyses of military affairs emphasize ground and 
air forces.   
The purpose of this thesis is to identify and analyze the determinants of changes 
in doctrine and force structure of United States naval forces in Europe since the 1980s. 
The period from the establishment of the Maritime Strategy in the 1980s to the 
contemporary post-11 September 2001 security environment is the focus of this study.  
Four factors are examined as possible determinants of doctrinal shifts and changes in 
force structure.  The first concerns geopolitics, including the changes in the political and 
security environment in Europe.  The second factor to be examined is the inter-service 
competition for resources, including the effect of congressionally mandated jointness in 
military operations.  The third determinant examined is the influence of key individuals 
in the United States political and military command structure, including those in the U.S. 
Navy, the Department of Defense, and elected officials of both the executive and the 
legislative branches. Finally, the relationship between the United States and its NATO 
Allies throughout the time period is examined as a possible determinant. 
Comparatively little has been written about evolving maritime security issues in 
Europe in the period following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, despite their intrinsic 
significance.  The focus of most U.S. naval studies has been the Persian Gulf region and 
East Asia. This thesis offers findings about the roles and contributions of U.S. naval 
forces in Europe.  
The thesis is based on primary and secondary sources.  The primary sources 
include Department of the Navy doctrinal statements, as well as essays and speeches by 
key members of the U.S. military and civilian leadership.  Secondary sources include 
histories and analyses of operations throughout the period. 
 Each chapter examines the force structure and doctrinal shifts of United States 
naval forces, including the Marine Corps, in Europe in a specific period of transition.  
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The chapters flow chronologically, and are bound by major events that clearly delineate 
the beginning and end of the period being examined.   
Chapter II begins with the implementation of the Maritime Strategy during the 
Reagan administration in the 1980s and concludes with the end of Operation Deliberate 
Force in September 1995.  The Maritime Strategy provided the impetus for the building 
of a 600-ship navy in the 1980s.  The focus of U.S. national security strategy during this 
period was on Europe, specifically a possible NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict. The Maritime 
Strategy was the doctrine that outlined the United States Navy’s role in a war in Europe.  
The end of the Cold War and the decreasing Soviet naval threat were among the catalysts 
for change in U.S. Navy doctrine in the early 1990s.  Changes in political leadership and 
the evolving importance of joint and coalition operations in the wake of the 1990-1991 
Persian Gulf War were also determinants in doctrinal and force structure change 
throughout this period.  In September 1992, the Department of the Navy published From 
the Sea.  This new doctrine for naval operations and its successor, Forward From the Sea 
in 1994, defined the missions of U.S. naval forces when they conducted combat 
operations with NATO allies in 1995.   
Chapter III examines the period from the November 1995 to June 1999. In 
November 1995 the Dayton Accords ending ethnic conflict in Bosnia were signed.  The 
NATO air campaign in the Kosovo conflict, Operation Allied Force, ended in June 1999.  
The relatively quick conclusion of the NATO operations in Bosnia may have been a 
factor in the setting of unrealistic goals for the United States and its NATO allies when 
Operation Allied Force began. While the scope of combat operations in Bosnia was 
limited to small geographic areas, those in Operation Allied Force were of greater scope 
in all areas of measurement.  The air strikes attacked targets throughout Serbia, including 
Kosovo.  The operations continued despite unforeseen Serb resolve in the face of the 
attacks.  Although the United States and its NATO Allies settled the conflict successfully, 
the process of getting to the end state was more difficult and costly then expected.  This 
chapter examines the roles of U.S. naval forces in the conflict.  It considers the four main 
determinants previously mentioned, as well as the performance of the naval components 
within a joint and combined war-fighting environment. 
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Chapter IV examines the role of U.S. and NATO naval forces in Europe from the 
conclusion of Operation Allied Force in June 1999 to the present.  Many challenges face 
naval forces in Europe today.  While the Central Command area of responsibility is the 
focus of the current operations against terrorist groups, the European Command area of 
responsibility, especially North Africa and the Mediterranean Sea, is a region of great 
importance in combating current threats. Since the 1980s, when naval forces conducted 
combat operations against targets in Libya and Syria, U.S. naval forces in the 
Mediterranean have been on the front lines in combating terrorism. Since the conclusion 
of the Kosovo conflict, and especially since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the 
U.S. Navy in Europe has been operating in what many consider a secondary theater.  
Alliance responsibilities, a shift to joint doctrine, and a changing geopolitical 
environment are among the current key determinants of the U.S. Navy’s force structure 
and operational posture in the European Command.  Today, NATO Allies have deployed 
naval forces to the Eastern Mediterranean as part of their efforts under the mutual defense 
clause of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty1 to honor commitments to the United 
States.  These forces have been used not only in the surveillance of shipping; they have 
conducted boarding operations as well.  Naval forces in Europe also have potential roles 
in preventing and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the 
Mediterranean and in theater missile defense in Europe.   
The conclusion brings together the findings about the operations, force structures 
and doctrines of the U.S. Navy in Europe from the Cold War to the current security 
situation. The objective is to deepen understanding of how and why the doctrine and 
force structure of U.S. naval forces in Europe have evolved from the Cold War to the war 
on terrorism. 
 
                                                 
1 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that an attack against one or more members of the 
NATO Alliance is considered an attack against all members.  The full text of the North Atlantic Treaty is 






















II. THE MARITIME STRATEGY AND THE END OF THE COLD 
WAR: THE U.S. NAVY IN EUROPE 1986-1995 
It is the duty of the Navy to maintain control of the 
seas.  Russia can challenge our control of the seas with 
submarines and air power; both require bases. Early 
destruction of Russia’s bases and denial of advanced bases 
to her will necessitate heavy attacks immediately in 
different areas.  There will be so many demands made upon 
the Navy for immediate operations in widely spread parts 
of the world that fulfillment of all demands may well be 
beyond the capacity of the United States Navy. 
Captain Arleigh A. Burke (1948)2 
    [Chief of Naval Operations, 1956-1961] 
 
.  This chapter analyzes the changing roles of U.S. naval forces in European 
security from the publication of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy in January 1986 
through the conclusion of Operation Deliberate Force in September 1995.  Conventional 
wisdom holds that the primary factor in the changing of U.S. Navy doctrine and force 
structure in Europe is geopolitics.  In this period the major shift in the geopolitical 
situation in Europe was the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  Geopolitics is only one 
factor in the shift in doctrine and force structure, however.   Inter-service competition for 
resources and the legislated jointness of United States military forces also constitute a 
factor.  Decisions by both military and civilian leaders in the Department of Defense and 
the Executive Branch of the United States contributed to changes in force structure and 
doctrine as well.  Finally, the evolving role of the NATO Alliance in providing security 
in Europe in response to the changing geopolitical environment is a factor. 
In the 1980s U.S. Navy doctrine and force structure were designed to counter a 
threat from the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites.  Admiral James D. Watkins, 
then Chief of Naval Operations, first published the U.S. Navy’s doctrine entitled the 
Maritime Strategy in January 1986.  The doctrine called for an offensive strategy of naval 
warfare, focused during war on drawing the Soviet Navy into a global conflict.  “The 
                                                 
2 National Security Organization, National Security and Navy Contributions Thereto for the Next 10 Years. 
Encl D, page 52,1948.  Quoted in Michael A. Palmer, Origins of the Maritime Strategy (Washington 
D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1988), p. 59. 
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central point of the Maritime Strategy was that the Navy would begin direct offensive 
action against the Soviet Union from the first moment of a general war in order to shape 
that war and turn it into a protracted, global, nonnuclear conflict that would take 
advantage of the geographic, political, military and economic positions of the United 
States.”3  The plan represented a strategic innovation, in that it called for expanding a 
potential conflict beyond central Europe.  Prior to the Maritime Strategy, naval plans 
focused on keeping open sea lines of communication in the north Atlantic, escorting 
Allied merchant vessels, and preventing Soviet submarines from passing through the 
Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap.  These actions were all primarily designed to 
protect Allied supply lines, rather than using naval forces to directly attack enemy land 
bases on the periphery of the European continent.   
The Maritime Strategy was set upon the premise that the Soviet Union would 
prefer to fight a war concentrated in one theater of operations.  Specifically, the Soviet 
Union would seek to take advantage of its numerical superiority in manpower and 
materiel in central Europe.  The success of the Maritime Strategy was dependent on 
drawing Soviet resources away from central Europe to the periphery of the continent, as 
well as forcing the Soviets to protect their assets in the Pacific.  Prior strategy called for 
the United States to transfer naval assets to the Euro-Atlantic region.  The new doctrine 
called for continuing operations in the Pacific region in an effort to force the Soviet 
Union to defend everywhere at once.  In the Euro-Atlantic theater, maritime forces would 
be employed not only for merchant escort, but to actively seek out and destroy Soviet 
naval forces in the open ocean and to attack the periphery of the continent both from the 
Mediterranean Sea and the North Sea/Barents Sea area. 
The Maritime Strategy consisted of two components, crisis response and 
warfighting.  “Between 1946 and 1982, in some 250 instances of employment of 
American military forces, naval forces constituted the principal element of our response 
in about 80% of the crises.”4  Admiral Watkins argued that the mobility and forward 
deployed nature of naval forces make them the ideal crisis response and deterrence 
instrument. Naval forces have the ability to control escalation because they can be 
                                                 
3 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power (Stanford: University Press, 1994), p. 429. 




unobtrusive, and by remaining in international waters they can reduce political 
sensitivities. 
The warfighting portion of the strategy consisted of three phases:  Deterrence or 
the Transition to War, Seizing the Initiative, and Carrying the Fight to the Enemy.5  The 
deterrence phase would include a forward deployment of U.S. naval forces to make the 
Soviet Union rethink its options and abilities.  “Aggressive forward movement of anti-
submarine warfare forces, both submarines and maritime patrol aircraft, will force Soviet 
submarines to retreat into defensive bastions to protect their ballistic missile submarines.  
This both denies the Soviets the option of a massive early attempt to interdict our sea 
lines of communication and counters such operations against them that the Soviets 
undertake.”6  The deterrence phase also called for forward deployment of carrier forces 
and the periodic embarkation of Marine Corps forces aboard their amphibious vessels in 
order for these forces to be in a position to fight effectively should war occur.   
The second phase of the strategy was, as noted above, “Seizing the Initiative.” 
Operating under the assumption that the Soviets would prefer to wage a conflict focused 
on central Europe, U.S. naval forces would attack Soviet naval forces worldwide and 
neutralize Soviet client states.  Simultaneously, U.S. and Allied anti-submarine forces 
would attempt to negate the Soviet threat to sea-lanes.7  The primary purpose of this 
phase was to destroy the entire Soviet fleet. The third phase of the strategy was “Carrying 
the Fight to the Enemy.”  In this phase American and alliance forces would continue to 
attrite Soviet forces at sea, while conducting amphibious attacks on the Soviet flanks.  
Carrier forces would attack the USSR’s periphery to compel the Soviets to disperse their 
forces, and thereby influence the war on the central European front.  The authors of the 
strategy apparently believed that all of these operations could be conducted with the goal 
of preventing the conflict from escalating to a nuclear exchange while bringing the war to 
an end on terms acceptable to the United States and its NATO Allies. 
The determinants mentioned above (geopolitics, jointness, changes in leadership, 
and the relationship of the United States with its allies) led to criticism of the Maritime 
                                                 
5 Watkins, “The Maritime Strategy,” p. 8-13. 
6 Watkins, “The Maritime Strategy,” p. 9. 
7 The Maritime Strategy refers to NATO allies and to other U.S. allies, such as Japan. 
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Strategy, and eventually its replacement as the U.S. Navy’s doctrine.  The dissolution of 
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 1991 placed into question the need for a 
strategy built around 600 ships and global conflict.  Moscow began to scrap many of its 
ships, and abandoned its own blue-water doctrine.  As a result of this and a debilitating 
national economic crisis, Soviet and then Russian naval readiness declined rapidly.  The 
Gulf War in 1990-1991 also caused U.S. strategists to focus military planning efforts 
away from a global conflict and towards smaller regional conflicts. 
When the concept of the Maritime Strategy was in formation, the Goldwater-
Nichols Act of 19868 had not yet been signed into law. That sweeping measure attempted 
to unify the services, in part by reducing the authority of the individual service chiefs and 
the civilian secretaries.  It also elevated the Chairman of the Join Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) 
to the powerful position of primary military advisor to the President and Secretary of 
Defense.  The Department of the Navy opposed the forced jointness and interservice 
competition for resources that the act would impose.  The strategy caused rivalry between 
the United States Navy and Marine Corps, and their sister services, the U.S. Army and 
Air Force.  While the Navy and Marine Corps had developed the Maritime Strategy, the 
joint Army-Air Force AirLand Battle doctrine was implemented.  The Goldwater-Nichols 
Act required centralized command of all U.S. military assets in a theater under a single 
theater Commander in Chief (CINC)9.  In the European theater the U.S. CINC has never 
been a U.S. Navy officer, but always an Army, Air Force, or Marine Corps officer.  This 
fact strengthened the influence of traditional continental-oriented European strategists.  
As a result, the naval portion of a military strategy in Europe declined in importance.  
The declining Soviet blue water threat reduced the possibility of a new “Battle of the 
Atlantic” scenario in which U.S. and allied naval forces would be need to keep the 
Atlantic sea lines of communication open in the face of a substantial Soviet naval threat.  
                                                 
8 “The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.”  For further analysis, 
see Gordon Lederman, Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 
(Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1999). 
9 The title Commander in Chief and the acronym CINC, were replaced by the term combatant 
commander in October 1992.  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld replaced the term saying that there is 




Military and civilian leadership changes encouraged a shift away from a global 
maritime strategy.  First, the Goldwater-Nichols Act legislated that the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs would serve as the primary military advisor to the President and Secretary of 
Defense.  Prior to the passage of the Act, the individual service chiefs had greater 
autonomy in communicating their viewpoints directly to the President and the Secretary 
of Defense.  Under the new legislation, the Chairman presented either the consensus of 
the Joint Chiefs’ opinions or his own opinions to his civilian superiors.  Concurrently, the 
Act increased the authority of the regional CINCs, especially with regard to joint 
operations.  “Formerly, and more appropriately to Navy thinking, joint operations were 
the result of compromise between the services.  Now in a reaffirmation of the long trend 
towards centralization, the authority to conduct naval operations was specifically taken 
away from the Navy and put under whomever might be the appropriate [regional] 
commander in chief.”10 
Changes in civilian leadership also influenced the evolution of U.S. naval 
doctrine.  During the period examined, 1986-1995, three presidential administrations, 
each with its own priorities, influenced military and naval thought.  In addition, the 
power of the service secretaries was diminished by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.  
Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, the Maritime Strategy’s most influential proponent, 
found himself first with reduced authority. Soon thereafter, he resigned in protest over the 
diminished authority of his position as Secretary of the Navy.11   
Many of the NATO Allies had reservations about the Maritime Strategy.  The 
strategy could be seen as diverting the attention of naval forces away from the Euro-
Atlantic region by expanding the geographical scope of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.   
Some Europeans saw the strategy as a unilateral action plan by America that placed the 
defense needs of the European Allies in second place.  The continentalist approach to the 
defense of NATO focused attention on the central European front.  Any deviation from 
this plan was interpreted by continentalists as an abandonment of the primary focus of 
defending Western Europe.  The strategy focused on the defense of Allies on the 
                                                 
10 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power,  p.444. 




periphery of the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 612 territories, Turkey and Greece in the 
Mediterranean area, and Norway on the northern axis of the NATO alliance.   
U.S. Navy planners argued, however, that the plan was similar to the cooperative 
coalition strategy first developed by the allies in the late 1940s and the 1950s.  
“Cooperation had a force-planning value.  NATO assigned antisubmarine and mining 
roles to the United States’s NATO allies, enabling the offense-oriented leaders of the 
U.S. Navy to answer in the negative the question of whether it should pay much more 
attention to low-value warships and defensive sea control.”13  Despite this argument, 
NATO allies still found the precepts of the Maritime Strategy troubling.  When the Cold 
War ended with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, European allies found new reasons to 
question the need for an offensive strategy.  The changing geopolitical situation caused 
the NATO alliance to rethink its tenets. 
During the late 1980s, owing in large part to the determinants mentioned above, 
United States naval forces moved away from the doctrine and force structure needed for a 
Mahanian maritime strategy.  What followed was a downsizing of the fleet and a shift in 
doctrine to a littoral-based power projection strategy. 
 
 
A. FROM THE MARITIME STRATEGY TO FROM THE SEA: THE U.S. 
NAVY IN EUROPE 1990-1993  
 
When Louis Napoleon at the beginning of his presidency 
[in 1848] proposed to Britain that they should reduce their 
navies ‘upon somewhat the same relative scale,’ 
Palmerston replied, not without embarrassment that it was 
impossible for England with her world-wide possessions to 
make her fleet dependent on the size of the fleet maintained 
by any one power.14 
 
                                                 
12 Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty states which land and sea areas compose the territory of the 
NATO Alliance for the purpose of collective defense. 
13 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, p. 440. 
14 Martin Wight, Power Politics, ed. by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (London: Leicester 
University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1978), 272-273. 
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At the end of the Cold War, the United States found itself with a large fleet-in- 
being.  Although it never quite reached Secretary of the Navy Lehman’s goal of 600 
ships, in 1987 the U.S. Navy had 594 ships.15  This number included 223 surface 
combatants and 14 aircraft carriers.  Although the number of aircraft carriers rose to 15 
for a brief period in 1991, from its high point in 1987 the U.S. fleet began a steady 
decline in the number of warships and auxiliaries.  When the United States Navy 
published its new doctrine, From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st 
Century16 (hereafter, From the Sea), in September 1992, the total active fleet contained 
471 ships.  Of this total, 156 were surface combatants.  All of the Iowa-class battleships 
had been decommissioned, and the structure of the fleet began to shift away from open-
ocean operations to an emphasis on power projection ashore. 
On 2 August 1990, President George Bush delivered a speech that would have 
far-reaching consequences for the future military structure of the United States.  He spoke 
of “a world less driven by the immediate threat to Europe and the danger of global war.… 
a world where the size of our forces will increasingly be shaped by the need of regional 
contingencies and peacetime presence.”17  The Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991 further 
underscored the shift of American strategic thought away from Europe and towards other 
areas of the globe.  The war revealed the U.S. Navy’s weakness in mine warfare, sealift, 
and missile countermeasures.  All of these shortcomings would be critical in building a 
force structure focused on littoral warfare and power projection.  From the Sea spoke 
directly to this problem:  “Our ability to command the seas in areas where we anticipate 
future operations allows us to resize our naval forces and to concentrate more on 
capabilities required in the complex operating environment of the littoral or coastlines of 
the earth.  With the demise of the Soviet Union, the free nations of the world claim 
preeminent control of the seas…. As a result our national maritime policies can afford to 
de-emphasize efforts in some naval warfare areas.”18 
                                                 
15 All ship/ force structure numbers are from the Navy Historical Center Website.  U.S. Active Navy 
Ship Force Levels, 1917- . Available at www.history.navy.mil   8 December 2002. 
16 From the Sea, Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century, (Washington D.C.: Department of 
the Navy, 1992).  Available at http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea.txt 7 September 2003. 
17Bush quoted in George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, p. 446. 
18 From the Sea, Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century (Washington D.C.: Department of 
the Navy, 1992), p. 1-2. 
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The doctrine stated that the new force structure would include “Naval 
Expeditionary Forces – Tailored for Joint Operations, Operating Forward From the Sea – 
Tailored for National Needs.” Unlike the Maritime Strategy, no mention was made of a 
threat to United States security from a specific country or alliance.  The new strategy was 
capability- based.  It dictated what naval forces should be able to do, rather than 
assigning these forces specific missions in a given political context.  The new doctrine 
emphasized joint and coalition warfare.  From the Sea reflected and shaped great changes 
in the U.S. naval posture and force structure in the Euro-Atlantic area. 
Geopolitics, jointness, changes in leadership, and U.S. relations with Allies were 
all factors in the development and implementation of the new doctrine.  The security and 
political environment in 1992 was decidedly different from that in 1986.  The Cold War 
was over, the United States and its coalition partners had fought and won a regional war 
against Iraq, and the U.S. Navy was in search of a mission, especially in the Euro-
Atlantic region. During the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. Navy played a secondary role in 
the combat operations.  Naval amphibious forces were used only as a decoy, while Army 
and Air Force units conducted the majority of the combat operations.  The Navy realized 
that it needed to become a more integrated part of the joint force. 
In May 1993, the Department of the Navy published a policy paper specifically 
addressing the joint nature of the new doctrine.  The From the Sea update entitled “Joint 
Operations” recognized the challenges naval forces face in operating in the joint 
warfighting environment.  The document referred to geopolitical changes as the catalyst 
for a shift towards jointness. “Today, the absence of a global naval threat has virtually 
eliminated the need to conduct separate, independent naval operations far at sea.  Our 
operational focus has shifted to littoral warfare and direct support of ground operations.  
By exploiting their access to littoral regions, naval forces enable the introduction of 
heavier follow-on forces from our other services.”19  The significance of this policy 
statement is that it purposefully melded the naval services into a joint Army-Navy-Air 
Force-Marine Corps team.  From the Sea asserted that the maritime portion of the 
national military strategy was now part of the joint doctrine.  Instead of having a 
                                                 
19 From the Sea, update, Joint Operations. May, 1993.  Available at 
http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea/ftsujo.txt 7 September 2003. 
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Maritime Strategy and the AirLand Battle concept, the overall United States doctrine 
would be that of a Sea-Air-Land-Space Battle. 
In the European theater, the U.S. Navy immediately incorporated this shift in 
thinking into its routine.  The Commander in Chief of United States Forces Europe 
(USCINCEUR) conducted Exercise Ellipse Bravo in 1992.  The exercise was designed to 
assemble a large Joint Task Force, under the command of a naval officer, to be used in an 
emergency operation.  The U.S. Navy considered the exercise to have been successful, in 
that in 48 hours a joint Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps task force was 
organized; and command of the force was transferred to an aircraft carrier at sea.  From 
this sea-borne platform, an Air Force general, designated as the commander of the air 
component of the task force, operated successfully while embarked on the afloat 
command ship.20  The importance of the ability to conduct joint operations commanded 
afloat has increased as the permanent land-based overseas United States military presence 
has decreased. 
The United States Navy also specifically recognized the importance of allies and 
coalition partners in the post-Cold War security environment.  In the fall of 1993, the 
Department of the Navy published another policy paper as an update to From the Sea, 
titled “Working with Other Nations.”  According to the policy paper, From the Sea 
“recognizes the fundamental importance of establishing relations with security partners in 
peacetime before the onset of a crisis, and being forward-positioned to deter and react 
effectively to armed aggression.”21   
In the European theater, the NATO alliance was in the process of adopting new 
roles.  The Alliance’s new Strategic Concept was approved in 1991.  For the first time 
since its inception in 1949, the Alliance’s primary focus began to shift to tasks in addition 
to the traditional Article 5 mission.  The allies began to acknowledge and undertake non-
Article 5 responsibilities in support of collective security.  The importance of the U.S. 
Navy’s changing relationships with its counterparts in NATO nations and other European 
nations was demonstrated clearly in the revised focus of Baltic exercises and the 
establishment of a new standing naval force in the Mediterranean.  
                                                 
20 From the Sea, update, Joint Operations. May, 1993. 
21 From the Sea, update, Working With Other Nations. Fall, 1993. 
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 On the northern flank of the NATO alliance’s territory, the Commander in Chief 
of United States Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) had for years conducted the 
annual Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) exercise.  In 1993, however, the exercise was 
conducted for the first time with nations which had formerly belonging to the Soviet 
Union or which had been members of the Warsaw Pact.  Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and 
Russia participated in the event.  The exercise “suggest[ed] that the expanded BALTOPS 
exercise [could] help cement improved relations among nations in the Baltic region – 
while also improving U.S. bilateral relations.”22  
Since 1968, the U.S. Navy has provided forces to the Standing Naval Forces 
Atlantic (SNFL).  This NATO command was established to build interoperability 
between the naval forces of various NATO nations contributing to the unit.  The SNFL 
consists of surface combatants that have traditionally exercised throughout the Euro-
Atlantic region.  In 1992, NATO created a new standing multinational naval force, 
Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean (SNFM).  “Building on the SNFL precedent, the 
SNFM squadron was commissioned in 1992 and promptly deployed to enforce United 
Nations Security Council resolutions in connection with conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia.”23  The United States has routinely provided a surface combatant to the force 
which typically consists of between six and ten warships contributed by various members 
of the NATO Alliance 
The creation of SNFM signifies two important paradigm shifts in U.S. and 
Alliance naval thinking in Europe.  First, the SNFM is a force dedicated to the 
Mediterranean Sea, the model theater for littoral operations.  Second, in its day-to-day 
operations, the NATO alliance has shifted from its primary focus on collective defense 
and Article 5 missions to an increasing concentration on regional security and non-Article 
5 missions. 
During the Cold War, the United States and its European Allies had a distinct 
commonality of purpose.  The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact partners were an easily 
distinguishable adversary.  In the post-Cold War security situation, the United States has 
                                                 
22 From the Sea, update, Working With Other Nations. Fall, 1993. 
 




on various occasions chosen to defend its interests on a unilateral basis.  Even before the 
end of the Cold War, a clear example of such a situation arose in 1986 when the United 
States chose to conduct combat operations against Libya.  The United States took action 
without the combat assistance of any of its NATO Allies except Great Britain, and 
airspace over-flight rights became an issue that limited the availability of ground-based 
aircraft.  From the Sea emphasized that the expeditionary nature of naval forces gave the 
United States a potent military capability in any littoral area of the world, without the 
inherent problems of land-based forces in foreign countries.   
During the transition from the Maritime Strategy doctrine to From the Sea, the 
leadership of the United States changed.  The presidency moved from the Republican 
Party to the Democratic Party, and President William Clinton instituted a shift in 
emphasis of American political priorities from foreign policy to domestic issues.  Early in 
the Clinton Administration, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin ordered the Defense 
Department to conduct a “Bottom-Up Review.”  The review focused on regional 
contingency planning and leveraging technologies to compensate for reductions in the 
military force structure.  As an American analyst of defense affairs noted at the time, 
“The Bottom-Up Review is also designed against the backdrop of a reduced commitment 
of United States resources to defense overall.”24  The review identified ethnic conflict 
and weapons proliferation as major challenges in the future.  Early in the first Clinton 
Administration, the number of U.S. forces permanently deployed to Europe continued to 
decrease.  This cost-saving measure became necessary because of the changes in the 
geopolitical environment and a shrinking defense budget.  According to an American 
analyst at the time,  “faced with the need to reduce further the costs of the U.S. basing 
infrastructure – and the prospect that U.S. forces may not always be welcomed in Europe 
– Congress may be less and less disposed to support the equivalent of an Army corps 
deployment on the ground in Europe.”25  U.S. naval forces would be obliged to serve as 
the primary means of forward presence in Europe.  Secretary Aspin acknowledged this 
fact during his confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 
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January 1993.  “Our naval forces should be sized and shaped not only for armed conflict, 
but also for the many other important tasks we call upon them to do.  Forward presence is 
certainly a key ingredient of this mix, along with such missions as peacekeeping, 
humanitarian assistance, deterrence and crisis control.”26 
During the administration of President William Clinton, the general trend of 
United States military policy was to avoid the use of ground forces whenever possible.  
At the outset of his administration, President Clinton emphasized that naval and air power 
were the primary choices for any U.S. military response or presence mission. He 
underscored the importance of naval forces in crisis response in a speech on 12 March 
1993.  “When word of a crisis breaks out in Washington, it’s no accident that the first 
question that comes to everyone’s lips is: ‘Where is the nearest carrier?’”27   
In the wake of the casualties suffered by Task Force Ranger in Somalia in 
October 199328, when 18 Americans were killed in action while trying to capture a 
Somali warlord, and the resulting political fallout, the Clinton administration became 
even more hesitant to commit ground forces into any contested area of the world.  With 
the administration’s aversion to casualties, notably in ground force operations, the United 
States turned to air and naval power as its primary means of crisis response and forward 
presence.   
This shift had consequences in United States relations with NATO allies.  In 
1992-1995, some of the NATO European nations (mainly France and the United 
Kingdom) provided forces under United Nations Security Council mandates to the United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia.  During these years the United States 
minimized its commitment of ground forces to Bosnia.  Bush and Clinton administration 
officials made reference to Bosnia as a potential Vietnam.  Officials used such terms as 
“quagmire” and “slippery slope” when referring to possible ground troop deployments to 
the Balkans.  “A countervailing concern during the period from 1992 to mid-1995 was 
that, if the United States continued to limit its military involvement in the conflict to air 
                                                 
26 Prepared testimony of Les Aspin from 15 January 1993, quoted in Jacquelyn K. Davis, Aircraft 
Carriers and the Role of Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century, p. 17. 
27 President Clinton’s speech aboard U.S.S Theodore Roosevelt, quoted in Jacquelyn K. Davis, 
Aircraft Carriers and the Role of Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century, p.21. 
28 For a full explanation see Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: 
Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999). 
17 
 
and naval operations while pushing for firmer action on the ground, this could cause the 
Alliance to unravel.”29  The United States limited its participation to Operation Sharp 
Guard, the embargo enforcement against the former Yugoslavia, and to air power in 
enforcing no-fly zones in Bosnia. 
 
B. FORWARD…FROM THE SEA AND OPERATION DELIBERATE 
 FORCE: THE U.S. NAVY IN EUROPE 1994-1995 
 
In 1993, the United States Navy consisted of 454 active ships.  This number 
would continue to drop throughout the Clinton administration.  By 1994, the U.S. Navy 
had 12 active carriers, its smallest number since 1941.  By contrast, the navy’s new 
emphasis on littoral warfare was seen in the rise in the number of mine warfare and patrol 
vessels in the early 1990s.  In September 1992, the active navy force included 6 patrol 
ships and 16 mine warfare vessels.  By September 1995, the active force had 12 patrol 
ships and 18 mine warfare vessels. The number of mine warfare ships would continue to 
grow to a high of 29 vessels in 1999.  The U.S. Navy also introduced new classes of 
amphibious ships in an attempt to modernize that portion of its fleet. The number of 
destroyers, cruisers and other surface warships continued to decline, from 156 in 1992 to 
a new low of 128 in September 1994, the lowest such total since 1931.30 
Published by the Department of the Navy in September 1994, Forward From the 
Sea was intended to update and expand upon the From the Sea concept published in 
1992.  This new doctrine did not dramatically shift the direction of the U.S. Navy and 
Marine Corps; it merely reinvigorated the principles previously set forth of emphasizing 
the littorals, expeditionary warfare, forward presence and regional conflict.  Forward 
From the Sea focused on allied and coalition operations and specifically mentioned 
relations with America’s NATO allies and members of the Partnership for Peace.  
“Participation in both NATO Standing Naval Forces and in a variety of exercises with the 
navies, air forces, and coalition partners around the Pacific rim, Norwegian Sea, Arabian 
Gulf, and Mediterranean basin provide solid foundations for sustaining interoperability 
                                                 
29 David Yost, NATO Transformed (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), p. 
197. 
30 All ship/force structure numbers are from the Navy Historical Center Website.  U.S. Active Navy 
Ship Force Levels, 1917-  . Available at www.history.navy.mil   8 December, 2002. 
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with our friends and allies.”31  The document also made reference to the success of the 
first naval exercises conducted with former Warsaw Pact nations.  “The outreach to the 
former Warsaw Pact countries in the NATO Partnership for Peace program will further 
build solidarity and interoperability.”32  In 1994 the U.S. Navy had participated in naval 
exercises that included forces from Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. 
In 1994-1995 the role of the NATO Alliance in European security changed as a 
result of the Alliance’s first use of deadly force in 1994 and the conduct of Operation 
Deliberate Force in 1995.  This operation had several key features involving the use of 
U.S. naval forces.  First, the NATO forces operated under the command of Admiral 
Leighton Smith, USN, then responsible for Allied Forces, Southern Europe (AFSOUTH).  
He was the first man to command NATO forces in combat in the Alliance’s history.  
Second, naval forces provided key components to the action, including carrier-based 
aircraft and Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) strikes.  U.S. naval air forces also 
provided the majority of electronic attack sorties in the operations.  The operation was a 
vindication of the From the Sea concept. U.S. naval forces were on the scene at the start 
of hostilities because of their forward deployed status, and were able to project power 
ashore to end regional ethnic conflict in a littoral region. 
The greatest revolution in strategic thinking as a result of Operation Deliberate 
Force was not its impact on naval doctrine or force structure, but rather the reorientation 
of NATO from an emphasis on collective defense to peace enforcement operations.  A 
precedent had been set for the conduct of non-Article 5 missions on the periphery of the 
Alliance.  Another effect of Operation Deliberate Force was a realization by the NATO 
Alliance that the United States was still the critical player in European security. 
“Deliberate Force … illustrated that a sustained NATO combat expedition is impossible 
without U.S. muscle: Satellite intelligence, electronic jamming, and other technological 
contributions were virtually all American, and the United States flew two-thirds of all 
aircraft sorties.”33  
                                                 
31 Forward From the Sea, 3. 
32 Forward From the Sea, 4. 
33Rick Atkinson, “With Deliberate Force in Bosnia.” Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 




The United States Navy’s role in European security from 1986 to 1995 involved a 
dynamic transformation.  The conventional wisdom is that the changing geopolitical 
environment in Europe is the primary cause of changes in the navy’s doctrine and force 
structure.  Other factors, however, were also important catalysts in this shift.  The 
changing leadership of the United States government, particularly in the Department of 
the Navy and Department of Defense, was a factor in the navy’s shifting posture.  
Throughout the period, the United States military shifted its overall organization toward a 
joint posture and force structure.  Finally, the changing role of the NATO alliance in 
providing security in the Euro-Atlantic region influenced the structure and doctrinal 
changes of the U.S. Navy.  In 1986, the U.S. Navy consisted of 583 ships.  Its doctrine 
and force structure were designed to confront a known enemy, the Soviet Union, on the 
open ocean.  The navy’s structure and doctrine were threat- based.  By the end of 1995, 
the U.S. Navy had an active force of 392 ships.  The navy’s doctrine had shifted away 
from an emphasis on open ocean warfare towards an expeditionary force designed to 
operate in the littorals and to project power ashore.  A shrinking defense budget, 
leadership changes, and a dynamic European security environment had changed the U.S. 
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III. FROM DELIBERATE FORCE TO ALLIED FORCE:              
THE U.S. NAVY IN EUROPE 1995-1999 
 
In 1995, the United States Navy participated in the first large-scale combat 
operations in NATO’s history.  The military actions carried out by the United States and 
its Allies in Operation Deliberate Force made for a quick end to the long ethnic conflict 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and led to the signing of the Dayton peace accords in Paris on 14 
December 1995.  Soon thereafter, United States military planners and civilian leaders 
focused the majority of their collective attention on areas outside Europe.  Combat 
operations in the Middle East, following the 1998 dismissal of the UN weapons 
inspectors from Iraq, and growing tensions on the Korean peninsula were the focus of 
American expeditionary forces.  The importance of Europe as a potential major theater of 
war shrank in the post-Deliberate Force military.  Less than 4 years later, however, 
NATO forces, including the United States Navy, were once again engaged in combat 
operations in Southeastern Europe.  Operation Allied Force would prove to be larger, 
longer, and more difficult than expected.  It drained the U.S. Navy of its precious 
supplies of precision weapons, and brought into question the Navy’s ability to retain 
adequate multi-theater global reach with its reduced force structure. 
During the period from December 1995 to June 1999, the military and civilian 
leadership of the United States underwent some changes.  Although these changes were 
not as drastic as those seen in the period covered in the previous chapter, they did have an 
impact on the way United States military forces, specifically the Navy, were employed.  
During this time, the geopolitical environment in the European Command and the other 
major combatant commands also changed, forcing a rethinking of naval force 
deployments.  Finally, the lessons learned from both the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991 
and Operation Deliberate Force in 1995 were used to organize the armed forces, 
particularly the Navy and the Air Force, into a more efficient joint team.  All of these 
factors, as well as the even greater emphasis placed on information warfare as the 1990s 
drew to a close, resulted in changes in the Navy’s overall force structure and doctrine.  
Each of the determinants considered in the previous chapter − geopolitics, jointness, the 
relationships between the United States and its allies, and the military and civilian 
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leadership of America − will once again be examined in this survey of the changes in the 
doctrine and force structure of the United States Navy in Europe during the period from 
late 1995 through Operation Allied Force in March-June 1999. 
At the close of 1995 and during the early part of 1996, the geopolitical situation 
facing the United States and its key allies was relatively calm.  The emergence of new 
states and regimes in Europe and Central Asia in the wake of the Cold War had for the 
most part been peaceful.  In the Middle East, the Navy and the Air Force continued to 
patrol the southern and northern no fly zones in Iraq, while United States and coalition 
warships patrolled the Persian Gulf in support of the United Nations embargo against 
Iraq.  At this point United Nations weapons inspectors were carrying out their task in Iraq 
with reasonable cooperation from the Saddam Hussein regime, although Iraqi 
cooperation became more restrained after March 1996 and was cut back significantly in 
January 1998.  The Pacific theater was relatively quiet; and Europe seemed to be 
enjoying a period of quiet as well, with the end of ethnic fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
On the domestic front, the United States economy was strong, and President Clinton was 
reelected to his second term in November 1996. 
The bombing of the Khobar Towers −buildings housing American military 
personnel in Saudi Arabia− in June 1996 shattered the calm.  The attack on the Khobar 
towers and the August 1998 bombings of two American embassies in East Africa ushered 
in a new period of conflict for the United States.  The United States military responded to 
the embassy bombings with Tomahawk missile strikes against suspected terrorist targets 
in Afghanistan and Sudan launched from ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea.  In 
January 1998 the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq denied access to key sites to United 
Nations weapons inspectors, who left Iraq in December 1998.  This led to U.S.-British 
retaliatory strikes against Iraq in December 1998.  In the Pacific, tensions flared in 
northeast Asia when in September 1998, North Korea fired a Taepodong-1 ballistic 
missile over Japan.  
Owing to these events and others the United States began to focus much of its 
military, diplomatic, and economic attention on areas of the world outside Europe.  The 
movement of U.S. Navy assets into various non-European regions clearly indicated a 
shift away from a Mediterranean emphasis on deployed battle groups.   During this same 
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time, however, the Balkan Peninsula began to experience a new set of problems.  “The 
situation in Kosovo began to deteriorate sharply in early March 1998 when Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) security forces launched a series of strikes to crackdown 
on the growing Kosovar insurgent movement known as the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA).”34  By the end of March, the United Nations Security Council had passed a 
resolution “condemning the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against 
civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by the 
Kosovo Liberation Army or any other group or individual and all external support for 
terrorist activity in Kosovo, including finance, arms, and training.”35  
In the context of this tumultuous geopolitical situation, jointness and interservice 
competition for resources were once again a major determinant in change.  “The early 
1990s were also a time of declining budgets, and although General Colin Powell, then 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs, had proclaimed that cuts would be shared equally (in 
percentage terms) by all military services, the Navy, like the Air Force, decided to 
promote a post-Cold War concept that justified at least a claim for increased budget 
shares.”36  The Navy had learned lessons from its interoperability problems of the Gulf 
War, and invested heavily in improving its joint communication systems and building its 
stocks of precision munitions.37  The lessons of Desert Storm and Deliberate Force 
showed that the Navy needed to make its doctrine compatible with that of the Air Force 
in order to continue its role as the preeminent expeditionary arm of the Defense 
Department.  The U.S. Navy and Air Force, as the primary air components within the 
United States military structure, had the greatest need to work towards a joint air power 
doctrine.  This was especially true as a result of the Clinton Administration’s 
unwillingness to commit ground forces into non-permissive environments.  “They made 
little progress towards creating ‘ties that bind’; from the end of the Vietnam War to at 
                                                 
34 Department of Defense “Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report” 
Report to Congress, 31 January 2000. page A-1. 
35 UN Security Council Resolution 1160  31 March, 1998. Available at www.un.org . 
36 Major General John L. Barry, USAF and James Blaker.  “After the Storm, The Growing 
Convergence of the Air Force and Navy” The Naval War College Review  Autumn 2001 available at 
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37 For detailed analysis of the Navy and the other services in Operation Desert Storm (1991), see 
Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The General’s War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in 
the Gulf  (Boston: Little Brown, 1995). 
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least the mid 1990s, the Air Force and the Navy simply thought about and operated 
within two separate conceptual worlds.”38 
The Air Force recognized the need to add an expeditionary component to its 
doctrine when it published Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force 
in 1996.   This document acknowledged that the Air Force “had to shift from a reliance 
on mass to a reliance on knowledge and information.  In the end, the Air Force had to do 
these things because they were the essence of true expeditionary power.”39  The Air 
Force now became capable of performing one of the Navy’s primary missions.  It became 
an expeditionary, quick reaction force.  While the Navy relied on forward deployment for 
its expeditionary capabilities, the Air Force relied not only on tactical aircraft located in 
theater, but also on long range stealth aircraft capable of flying precision missions from 
the continental United States to the Balkans and returning, with multiple mid-air 
refuelings, in a single sortie.    
 In response to the Air Force’s new joint expeditionary doctrine, the Navy 
developed a new doctrine that built upon the From the Sea and Forward From the Sea 
concepts.  Forward From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept was the new doctrine, 
published by then Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson in March 1997.  In 
this new doctrine, jointness was an important theme.  In the foreword to the new doctrine 
Admiral Johnson stated that “We will have an integral role in future joint operations.”40  
The purpose of the new doctrine was to emphasize the role that naval forces can play in a 
joint environment while following the three tenets of the National Military Strategy: 
peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention. 
The first section of the document, “How the Navy Operates,” counters the Air 
Force’s position that it is the nation’s primary expeditionary force.  It states that naval 
expeditionary forces “are a potent and cost-effective alternative to power projection from 
the continental United States and are suited ideally for the many contingencies that can be 
deterred or quickly handled by forward-deployed forces.  Expeditionary operations 
                                                 
38 Major General John L. Barry, USAF and James Blaker.  “After the Storm, The Growing 
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39 Major General John L. Barry, USAF and James Blaker.  “After the Storm, The Growing 
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40 Forward From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept, March 1997 available at 
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complement, enable and dramatically enhance the effectiveness of continental power-
projection forces when a larger military response is needed.” 41  The Navy was clearly 
attempting to defend its position as the leading expeditionary element of the Department 
of Defense, and to underscore the fact that, especially in a context of overseas basing 
draw downs, naval forces remain the key to overseas presence, power projection and 
deterrence.  
The section of the document entitled “Peacetime Engagement” indicates that 
naval forces are ideally suited to supporting diplomatic efforts and building coalitions.  
“We build confidence in U.S. security pledges by demonstrating our ability to ensure that 
land-based forces deploying from the continental United States will have ready access to 
the region in a crisis.”42  This statement focuses on the value of expeditionary forces, 
while alluding to the Navy’s role in preparing the joint battlespace.  The doctrine focuses 
on the ability of naval forces to use precision weaponry and information superiority in 
shaping the joint battlespace. The role of naval forces in deterring potential adversaries is 
highlighted in the doctrine as well. 
Finally, naval forces can remain on scene after the 
joint campaign concludes to enforce sanctions and to 
maintain U.S. presence for regional stability.  We prevent 
the need for yet another joint campaign by taking 
advantage of our self-sustaining endurance to keep combat 
credible forces in the region.  Our most significant 
contribution well may be to prevent the next conflict 
entirely through our forward presence for engagement and 
deterrence.43   
 
It was with this doctrine that the U.S. Navy entered the second major Balkan 
combat operation of the 1990s, Operation Allied Force.  The new doctrine envisaged 
future conflict deterrence because of credible forward presence in the wake of a joint 
operation.  However, naval forces failed to prevent a second ethnic conflict in 
southeastern Europe, despite continued engagement in the area.  It is not clear whether 
this was a failure of the Forward From the Sea concepts, or whether the geopolitical 
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situation in theaters outside Europe prohibited the U.S. Navy from retaining sufficient 
combat power in the region to successfully deter another war. 
The role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in European security as well as 
the membership of the organization changed in 1995-1999.  The new NATO Allies that 
joined in this period were the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.  Although the 
admission of these nations was an important step in the transformation of NATO from a 
Cold War to a post-Cold War security organization, the new Allies contributed little to 
the Alliance in naval terms.  The second major change in the organization was an even 
greater emphasis on non-Article 5 missions.  During the NATO combat operations in 
Bosnia, the allies acted under the “infamous dual key arrangement under which the UN 
secretary general (or his designated representative) would have to approve the initiation 
and scope of any NATO air action.”44  During Operation Deliberate Force, NATO 
provided the combat power, but the United Nations Security Council authorized the 
action.  When Operation Allied Force began in March 1999, the arrangement was 
different.  NATO carried out the action without an explicit authorization of the use of 
force from the UN Security Council.   
The final determinant in the equation was leadership.  In 1995-1999, there were 
some key changes within the leadership of the U.S. Navy and the Department of Defense 
that affected the Navy in Europe.  When NATO had been conducting Operation 
Deliberate Force, the Chief of Naval Operations was Admiral Jeremy Michael Boorda.  
Before rising to the Navy’s top post, Admiral Boorda had extensive command experience 
in the European theater.  In 1987 he commanded the Sixth Fleet.  In 1991, when he was 
promoted to four-star rank, Admiral Boorda assumed the posts of Commander in Chief 
U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) and Commander in Chief Allied Forces 
Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH).  In this role he was in command of NATO forces in the 
Balkans.45  When Boorda became the CNO in 1994, the Navy had a Europe-focused 
officer at its head.  When Admiral Boorda committed suicide in May 1996, the Navy was 
left in a state of shock.  Admiral Boorda was replaced by Admiral Jay Johnson, an officer 
with NATO experience, who had been commander of the U.S. Second Fleet and 
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Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic.46  Although Admiral Johnson had been a naval 
commander within NATO, he did not have as much European experience as his 
predecessor. 
A similar shift in leadership experience occurred within the post of Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this period.  From 1993 until 1997, General John Shalikashvili 
was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  He was an Army officer with extensive 
European experience.  General Shalikashvili was born in Poland, and his tours as a 
general officer included assistant division command in Germany, deputy Commander in 
Chief of U.S. Army forces in Europe, and  (immediately before assuming the post as 
chairman) he was Supreme Allied Commander Europe. 47   In 1997 General Hugh 
Shelton replaced General Shalikashvili as Chairman.  General Shelton had virtually no 
experience in the European theater in his career.  In contrast with 1995, when the United 
States Navy participated in Operation Allied Force, its uniformed leadership no longer 
consisted of officers with extensive European and NATO experience. 
During the combat operations in the 1999 Kosovo conflict, the military leadership 
of the United States faced a challenge in balancing the command and control of a NATO 
operation, while maintaining the United States chain of command.  U.S. Army General 
Wesley Clark, who fulfilled the dual-hatted role as commander of all United States forces 
in Europe and Supreme Allied Commander, spoke directly to this issue in his book 
Waging Modern War. “There is a legal conundrum, however, in the way that U.S. 
military advice is given and received.  By law, the Joint Chiefs are advisors to the 
President.  But they only can be responsible for U.S. operations or the U.S. component of 
an Allied operation.  The legislation takes no account of the different responsibilities of 
officers in NATO positions, such as SACEUR.”48  Even though the United States 
provided more combat power than the other 18 NATO member nations, as SACEUR 
General Clark was required to work with all of the allies in terms of overall strategy.   
The United States Navy and its sister services conducted Operation Allied Force 
(1999) and Operation Deliberate Force (1995) under the same administration.  The 
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administration had, however, made some fundamental decisions as to how combat power 
could be employed which directly affected the role of the Navy in Europe.  The missile 
strikes against suspected terrorist camps in Afghanistan and Sudan in August 1998, as 
well as Operation Desert Fox against Iraq in December 1998, were almost entirely naval 
operations.  The strikes against terrorist compounds were “made with cruise missiles, not 
aircraft. The missiles were fired from ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea.”49  
Operation Desert Fox was also primarily a naval operation.  “This operation employs 
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft flying from the decks of the USS Enterprise; Air 
Force and Royal Air Force aircraft operating from land bases in the region, and 
Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from U.S. Navy ships at sea and United States Air 
Force B-52s.”50   As these examples illustrate, the focus of the Navy’s combat operations 
rapidly shifted from the Mediterranean and the Sixth Fleet in 1995 to the Middle East and 
the Central Command (CENTCOM) by 1998, only to return temporarily to the 
Mediterranean for Operation Allied Force in 1999. 
 The leadership of the United States was increasingly relying on both sea and 
land-based air power. This reliance would most affect the U.S. military in the period 
leading up to Operation Allied Force, when the Clinton Administration refused to 
consider the use of ground troops in Kosovo.  The United States would only endorse the 
use of NATO ground troops in Kosovo in a permissive environment.  President Clinton 
and Vice President Al Gore were adamant on this point.  On 24 March 1999, President 
Clinton stated “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war.”  Vice 
President Gore then stated authoritatively on 9 April, “That option is not under 
consideration.”51  The Navy and the Air Force shouldered the burden in the Kosovo air 
campaign.  Because of competing priorities in the Arabian Gulf, the U.S. force structure 
in place in the Mediterranean was severely taxed.  According to Vice Admiral Daniel 
Murphy, U.S. Sixth Fleet Commander During Operation Allied Force: 
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The sharing of carriers, surface combatants, amphibious ships and 
submarines between the Mediterranean and the Arabian Gulf is 
something we must do in order to balance our precious and limited 
resources against competing requirements.  There are simply not 
enough carrier battle groups, amphibious ready groups and 
submarines in the navy to meet global tasking.  These critical 
assets are essentially time-shared between theaters.  …Last year’s 
CVBG [carrier battle group] presence in the Mediterranean totaled 
only 40 percent of the CINCEUR requirement and little more than 
half the fair share objective.52  
 
A. THE U.S. NAVY AND OPERATION ALLIED FORCE: 24 MARCH – 10 
JUNE 1999 
 
In the preceding section, the individual determinants of change were examined in 
a general manner.  This section examines specific issues in the Kosovo campaign as they 
relate directly to the U.S. Navy.  The first of these issues is once again geopolitics.  The 
second issue was the inter-theater competition for major resources, which came to a head 
in the Kosovo campaign and the service most affected was the U.S. Navy.  Another 
geopolitical factor in naval operations during the conflict was the possible deployment of 
Russian naval assets to the Mediterranean during the campaign. 
By 1998, the military strategy of the United States clearly assumed that the two 
potential theaters of major regional conflict would be the Middle East and East Asia.  
This strategy further removed Europe from the forefront of military planning.  General 
Wesley Clark described the problems faced by his predecessor as CINCEUR, General 
George Joulwan, as follows:  “This was a major planning effort, from a theater that we 
had deliberately left out of the list of regional contingencies in the National Military 
Strategy, despite General Joulwan's pleas.  He argued repeatedly that if we didn’t assign 
to his theater an ‘MRC’ [Major Regional Contingency] designation, he would lose his 
priority on resources.  And since the time of Eisenhower, we had always looked on the 
NATO mission and our Alliance in Europe as our top priority.”53   
The issue of regional force structure came to a head regarding the employment of 
the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt.  The European Command this time had to 
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constantly provide resources to the Central Command because aircraft based in Turkey 
conducted Operation Northern Watch, the enforcement of the northern no-fly zone over 
Iraq.  A debate ensued between the U.S. European Command and U.S. Central Command 
as to which theater had the priority for resources.  General Clark wanted the Theodore 
Roosevelt assigned to his command.  The Navy simply did not have the resources to 
completely fulfill the requirements of both theaters.  According to General Clark, there 
was “a revealing article in The Washington Times, which described a tug of war between 
the European Command and the Central Command over the aircraft carrier Theodore 
Roosevelt.  It was probably a leak by the Navy, to justify the importance of its carriers.”54  
In the end, the carrier was eventually assigned to Operation Allied Force, and contributed 
significantly to its success. 
The other geopolitical issue was the possible deployment of a Russian naval 
group from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.  This presented both a military and a 
diplomatic concern to NATO.  The Russians demonstrated their seriousness because 
“they had notified the Turks of their intent to pass though the Dardenelles from the Black 
Sea to the Mediterranean in early April.  It was an unmistakable signal.”55  Although a 
Russian battle group deployment would cause concern, it would not be a “war stopper.”  
The seriousness of the situation was evident in General Clark’s order to Admiral James 
Ellis (CINCSOUTH) to “be prepared to implement a naval exclusion zone to keep the 
Russian naval vessels from interfering with us.”56  The potential deployment never 
materialized.  Russia did manage to deploy an intelligence collection vessel and a single 
Oscar-class submarine, the Kursk.  The impact on the Alliance’s operations was 
minimal.57 
The second issue to explore is the direct role that U.S. naval forces had in the 
combat operations.  The U.S. Navy was able to contribute significantly to Operation 
Allied Force because of various capabilities.  The Navy had invested heavily in precision-
guided munitions in the wake of the 1990-1991 Gulf War.  Because the weather 
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conditions over Kosovo were often severe, ship-launched Tomahawk missiles were often 
the only weapons available to maintain pressure on Serbia.  “In Kosovo, NATO forces 
operated under conditions in which there was at least 50 percent cloud cover more than 
70 percent of the time.”58  As a result of the weather conditions, satellite-guided TLAMs 
were often the weapon of choice.  A total of 218 sea-launched cruise missiles were fired 
from United States and British warships.  TLAMs were also considered the weapon of 
choice in areas where collateral damage was a major consideration.59  The high use rates 
of Tomahawk missiles, in the Kosovo campaign as well as in CENTCOM’s Desert Fox 
and the U.S. attacks on terrorist camps, meant that by the end of the Kosovo campaign, a 
shortage of missiles existed.  This prompted the U.S. Navy to seek emergency funding 
for missile conversions in order to ensure an adequate supply to the fleet.60  Operation 
Allied Force was a proving ground for the use of sea-launched Tomahawk missiles as a 
tactical weapon.  The Tomahawk was used for the first time against mobile targets, 
whereas in the past its use had been only against fixed targets.  “In fact, Allied Force saw 
the successful realization of TLAM as a tactical weapon.”61 
In addition to cruise missile strikes, the naval services provided two capabilities 
that were not present elsewhere in the American military arsenal.  The first is the virtual 
monopoly of the Navy and Marine Corps in the electronic attack mission because of their 
EA-6B aircraft, another asset which was taxed to its limits by worldwide commitments.  
The second capability was for quick reaction strike missions.  If a target needed to be 
struck immediately, the task was given to the Navy.  “Two systems could do it: the 
carrier air wing and the Tomahawk. Nothing else could, and that’s just a fact, and 
General Clark would validate that.”62  
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The amphibious component of the deployed naval forces, the Marine Corps units 
embarked on amphibious ships, also made important contributions to the operation.  The 
embarked Marines provided a ready source of ground troops to the operations should 
they be called upon, but the true contribution of these units in this conflict resided in their 
ability to provide additional security to United States interests in Macedonia, notably 
humanitarian assistance.  “During the Kosovo operation, the CINC designated the JTF 
[Joint Task Force] commander, who in turn designated the deployed Marine Air Ground 
Task Force (MAGTF) to act as a humanitarian assessment team.”63   
In this role, the Marines of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit provided security 
to refugees displaced to Macedonia.  “As the refugee flow shifted to Albania the 
ARG/MEU [Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit] moved from the 
Aegean to the Adriatic and commenced AV-8B strike sorties into Kosovo.  
Simultaneously, 24 MEU Marines teamed with MH-53 helicopters from USS Inchon to 
distribute supplies and build refugee camps in Albania.”64  The role of the Marine Corps 
in providing humanitarian assistance proved the utility of the ARG/MEU team in diverse 
missions which could be assigned by the joint force commander.  Once the hostilities 
concluded, the Marine Corps proved its role as an effective expeditionary force, as the 
26th MEU was the United States’ military ground force contribution to the Initial Entry 
Force.  The Marines set the stage for the heavier Army forces that followed as the 
Kosovo peacekeeping force was established on the ground.65 
 
B. CONCLUSION 
The period 1995 -1999 was a time of change for the United States Navy and its 
role as an instrument of U.S. security policy in Europe.  Changing geopolitical priorities 
combined with a shrinking force structure made it difficult to maintain the required 
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carrier coverage in all theaters.  The ongoing dispute between combatant commanders 
over the deployment of battle groups in the Mediterranean Sea and the Arabian Sea came 
to a head when the Kosovo campaign began and insufficient carrier force structure 
existed to conduct Operation Southern Watch and Operation Allied Force 
simultaneously.  In 1995, the United States Navy had 392 active duty warships.  By 1999, 
the number had dropped to 352 warships.  This represented the lowest number of ships 
since 1938.66  This decrease was a significant factor in the ability of the Navy to provide 
the EUCOM-requested ship deployments in the face of a continued change in planning 
emphasis on the Middle East and East Asia.  
During the period, the Navy and Marine Corps team moved significantly towards 
more jointness with their sister services.  Operation Allied Force was a success story in 
terms of the ability of the air arms of the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force to work 
together in shaping the joint battlespace.  When the Kosovo campaign came to a 
conclusion, however, the future role of the Navy in European security was once again in 
question.  The military planners of the United States once again directed emphasis 
towards other theaters.  No new major threats to U.S. security interests in Europe were 
present.  Although Russia had suspended various forms of cooperation and dialogue with 
NATO at the outset of the Alliance’s Kosovo air campaign in March 1999, Moscow 
decided in early 2000 to resume meetings of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council 
with an agenda broader than peacekeeping in the Balkans.  The Alliance continued to 
cultivate improved relations with former adversaries and other non-NATO countries in 
the Euro-Atlantic region via Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council. 
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IV. FROM OPERATION ALLIED FORCE TO THE WAR ON 
TERROR: THE U.S. NAVY IN EUROPE 1999-2003 
 
The end of combat operations in Operation Allied Force marked another 
adjustment in the scale of involvement of the U.S. military in European security issues.  
Although the United States continues to contribute significantly to peacekeeping forces in 
Kosovo and Bosnia, few threats to U.S. security interests in Europe are foreseen in the 
near future.  World geopolitical events in the 1999-2003 period, notably the war on 
terrorism, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Afghanistan, 
shifted the focus of United States military assets even further from European issues than 
they had been previously.  European nations and the NATO Alliance continued to change 
their command and force structures to support more expeditionary operations in order to 
remain relevant as military institutions. Moreover, during this period, ballistic missile 
threats to both Europe and the United States led to renewed debate about the usefulness 
of ballistic missile defense.  The period between the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks 
and the conclusion of major combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom (1 May 2003) began with 
unprecedented support for the United States from its European Allies, including the first 
ever invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.  The months leading up to 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (which began on 19 March 2003) were, however, fraught with 
disagreements among NATO nations over the legitimacy of the use of force in Iraq.  
These disagreements seemed to separate the United States from many of its traditional 
Allies as much as the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks had united them.  
This chapter continues to describe and analyzes the role of the U.S. Navy as an 
instrument to advance and defend U.S. security interests in Europe.  The analysis 
considers the same determinants examined in previous chapters.  Special emphasis is 
placed on the relationships between the United States and its European Allies during the 
1999-2003 period, and on the role of geopolitics in shaping the U.S. force structure 
further away from a Eurocentric emphasis.  U.S. forces are increasingly designed to 




In past chapters, the determinant of geopolitics has been examined as a security 
issue.  The dwindling U.S. military presence in Europe has been attributed specifically to 
assessments of a declining military security threat.  While the demise of the Soviet Union 
and the completion of combat operations in the Balkans were certainly grounds for a 
decreased U.S. military presence, economic factors must also be considered.  During the 
1990s, Mediterranean Europe, the region in which the U.S. Navy has conducted the vast 
majority of its European deployments, has steadily declined in its relative economic 
importance to the United States.  
In the early 1970s, the entire Mediterranean Basin −that is, 
the countries with Mediterranean coastline−accounted for 
approximately 10 percent of all U.S. trade (exports and 
imports combined).  Since then, the Mediterranean’s 
percentage has steadily declined.  During the last five years 
for which data are available (1994-1998), its share has been 
in the 6.8-7.3 percent range.  The high end of the range 
represents a 25 percent reduction over nearly three decades, 
the low end a drop of fully one-third.  These reductions in 
the relative position of the Mediterranean region reflect the 
dramatic increases that have taken place in U.S. trade with 
other regions, particularly the Pacific Rim and other parts 
of North America.  These data suggest that despite 
significant increases in absolute values, relative to other 
parts of the world the Mediterranean region has become 
significantly less important in economic terms to the United 
States.67 
 
One of the primary purposes of forward deployed naval forces is to keep open sea 
lines of communication to ensure unrestricted trade between the United States and its 
partners.  Considering the evolving security tasks and the declining importance of 
Mediterranean Europe as a percentage of U.S. trade, a shift in emphasis, force structure, 
and forward deployments towards the Middle East and the Far East makes economic and 
military sense for U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces. 
The terrorist attacks against the United States of 11 September 2001 changed the 
geopolitical outlook of the entire world, and caused the United States to reevaluate its 
strategy of predetermined regional deployments.  The U.S. Sixth Fleet, historically 
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responsible for the Mediterranean region, was forced to transfer many of its afloat assets 
to the Central Command area of responsibility in the Middle East in order to support 
Operation Enduring Freedom, specifically the military operations against the Al Qaeda 
terrorist network and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, beginning in October 2001.  In a 
show of support for the United States following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, 
the NATO Alliance invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in the 
Alliance’s history.  One of the most visible deployments of NATO forces in the 
immediate post-11 September 2001 aftermath was the deployment of the Standing Naval 
Forces Mediterranean to the eastern Mediterranean.  Although the initial deployments of 
NATO assets to the area began on 6 October 2001, Operation Active Endeavor officially 
began on 26 October 2001. The purpose of Operation Active Endeavor was and would 
continue to be “to conduct naval operations in the Mediterranean to actively demonstrate 
NATO’s resolve and solidarity. Operation Active Endeavor is one of the measures 
resulting from NATO’s decision to implement Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.”68   
Since the beginning of Operation Active Endeavor in October 2001, the mission 
of the assigned forces has been expanded, and the operation has taken on a more 
permanent nature.  In order to maintain continuous presence, the Standing Naval Forces 
Mediterranean have rotated duties with the Standing Naval Forces Atlantic enabling 
NATO to maintain continuous surveillance of suspect merchant shipping in the 
Mediterranean.  In February 2003, the operation expanded to include the escort of Allied 
merchant vessels through the Straits of Gibraltar.  The operation took an even more 
active role by initiating boarding operations against suspect vessels on 29 April 2003.  
“The North Atlantic Council, the Alliance’s highest decision-making body, decided to 
extend NATO’s maritime operations in the Mediterranean to include boarding operations 
against suspected terrorist activities in the Mediterranean.”69  The expansion of the 
operation has a two-fold meaning for the United States and its naval forces.  First, the 
operation enables more U.S. assets to leave Mediterranean Europe to conduct operations 
in the Central Command area.  Second, the operation is a visible sign of international 
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support for the United States in the war against terrorism, regardless of the political 
differences among NATO members about supporting United States operations against the 
Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. 
A second example of Allied cooperation in what U.S. officials call the Global 
War on Terrorism, regardless of the political disputes over the war in Iraq, is NATO 
taking on the leadership of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) in Kabul, Afghanistan, in August 2003.  This deployment is especially significant 
as it is the first time that the Alliance has conducted a mission outside the Euro-Atlantic 
region.  General Sir Jack Deverell, the NATO commander of ISAF forces, said that this 
deployment was “a milestone in NATO’s development representing a real break from the 
NATO of the past to an Alliance which is more relevant and has greater utility in the 
uncertain security environment of the future.”70  The deployment is significant as it 
shows NATO’s resolve to transform itself into a military organization that is relevant in 
the current geopolitical situation. 
The U.S. government’s assessment of current geopolitical threats was evidences 
on 6 February 2002, when the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), George Tenet, gave 
testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence entitled “Worldwide 
Threat – Converging Dangers in a Post 9/11 World.”  Although a threat to European 
interests from terrorist organizations is mentioned, almost all of the testimony deals with 
the Middle East and other areas of the Muslim world.  Scant attention is paid to threats in 
Europe, with the exception of a continued threat to peacekeeping forces deployed in the 
Balkans, a threat that Tenet ties to the war on terrorism.  “U.S. and other international 
forces are most at risk in Bosnia, where Islamic extremists from outside the region played 
an important role in the ethnic conflicts of the 1990s.”71  
 Tenet testified that the gravest danger facing the United States had become the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue regimes and non-state actors, 
particularly terrorist groups.  In the DCI’s testimony Russia is indicated as a primary 
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threat to security, not because it poses a danger in itself, but as a possible source for the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  “Russian entities continue to provide other 
countries with technology and expertise applicable to CW, BW, nuclear, and ballistic and 
cruise missile projects.”72  During the entirety of the Cold War, the threat of weapons of 
mass destruction came from states that could be deterred by a strategy of threatening 
retaliation in kind, at least with regard to nuclear and chemical weapons, if necessary.  In 
the post-11 September 2001 security environment the United States has placed greater 
public emphasis on the strategic option of preemptive action and on operations in areas 
outside Europe.  This could further reduce the number of forces the United States could 
commit to Europe. 
The relationship between the United States and its European allies during the 
1999-2003 period was dynamic and uneven.  It included both unprecedented cooperation 
in the war on terror, and dissent from many traditional allies regarding the legitimacy 
and/or utility of the preventive war against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq in March-
April 2003.  During the Gulf War in 1990-1991, many nations provided combat forces to 
the multinational effort to remove the Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait.  In Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, however, Poland and the United Kingdom were the only European NATO 
members who contributed combat forces.   
One episode that prompted some controversy in relations among the NATO Allies 
was the request by the Turkish government that its Allies take steps to prepare for the 
defense of Turkish territory once war with Iraq appeared imminent.  Much political 
debate among member nations ensued. In the end, the Alliance’s Defense Planning 
Committee (a body in which France prefers not to participate) agreed to undertake the 
planning and related work for deployment of theater missile defenses, chemical and 
biological warfare defenses, and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) 
aircraft to Turkey.  
The structure of United States forces in Europe also began to change dramatically 
during the period.  U.S. naval forces deployed to the Mediterranean were used to directly 
attack Iraq.  During the first Persian Gulf War, U.S. warships patrolled the 
Mediterranean, but over-flight rights and other political factors prohibited any carrier-                                                 




launched strikes from the Mediterranean.73  During Operation Iraqi Freedom, direct 
combat action came in the form of strikes from carrier-based aircraft and Tomahawk-
carrying surface combatants located in the Eastern Mediterranean.  “During the war, the 
Mediterranean was a busy place.  Two Navy carrier strike groups, centered around the 
USS Harry S. Truman and the USS Theodore Roosevelt, launched strike aircraft and 
Tomahawk cruise missiles into Iraq.”74  This activity was one of the first steps in a 
strategy of not viewing the European theater as a primary area of combat operations, but 
rather as a base or “lily pad” from which operations into more volatile areas of the world 
could be launched.  
Two events in 2003 indicated that the United States was changing its attitude 
towards the structure and leadership of its forces assigned to Europe:  first, the selection 
of the first-ever Marine Corps officer as the Combatant Commander for the U.S. 
European Command and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe; and, second, a 
shift in ground force deployments away from the traditional U.S. garrisons in Germany 
towards Eastern Europe.  Moreover, European-based U.S. forces have begun to increase 
their attention to contingencies in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. 
Marine General James Jones assumed his role as Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe (SACEUR) in January 2003.  “Jones, a former U.S. Marine Corps commandant 
who was born in Paris and speaks fluent French, also heads the U.S. European Command 
(EUCOM), making him a key player in synching NATO and Pentagon transformation 
efforts.”75  In June 2003, at the direction of the North Atlantic Council, a new functional 
command, the Allied Command for Transformation (ACT), was established.  ACT is 
commanded by Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, USN, who serves as Supreme Allied 
Commander for Transformation. This move eliminated the Alliance’s Atlantic 
Command, consolidated all NATO forces under a single operational command, and 
moved all NATO naval forces under the direction of SACEUR. When questioned about a 
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Marine Corps officer being chosen for the command, General Jones responded as 
follows. 
I have a background in Europe, I was raised here, I have an 
affinity for NATO, I think it’s very important for the future.  
The Marine Corps is a very transformational organization.  
It’s very expeditionary. It has been in the integrated 
combined arms business for 40 or 50 years.  And if those 
who decided they wanted me to come here think that’s a 
good idea, then I’m happy to be here because that’s what I 
know how to do.76 
 
The choice of a commander who has European and expeditionary experience, and 
who is a great proponent of transformation, is indicative of the new U.S. strategy in favor 
of transforming force structures throughout NATO, and shifting away from permanent 
garrisons of forward deployed forces in Europe to security provided by expeditionary 
forces, with a further emphasis on jointness. 
The Alliance recognized the growing importance of expeditionary forces when at 
the Prague Summit in November 2002, the NATO Heads of State and Government 
decided to create a NATO Response Force (NRF).  The NRF will be a military structure 
“consisting of a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and 
sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly wherever is 
needed, as decided by the Council.”77  The decision to create this force was a positive 
step by the NATO political leadership in recognizing the utility of establishing an 
expeditionary force for potential use within and beyond the Euro-Atlantic region.  The 
force is to serve as a model for transformation of NATO forces, and is expected to have 
attained initial operational capability by October 2004. 
The decision by U.S. military and political leaders to change the forward 
deployment of U.S. forces to make them more relevant to current security conditions 
includes a new emphasis on operations in Africa, most of which lies within the U.S. 
European Command’s area of responsibility. The August-September 2003 deployment of 
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces towards Liberia is an example of such a shift.  Using 
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bases within Europe as a “lily pad” for operations outside has Europe gained support 
since 2001.  General Jones explained his position on this issue as follows: 
I said that we need to find different terms and so we found different 
terms.  We’re talking about hubs and lily pads and things that were 
visually relevant, but as a formal term are not very useful.  So we have 
been engaged in developing a series of iterative briefings to propose a 
transformation of our European footprint for a number of years.  The 
terms used now are joint main-operating bases, joint forward-operating 
bases, and joint forward-operating locations.78 
 
In 2002, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, USN released an 
entirely new doctrine for naval forces, Sea Power 21.  Unlike past doctrines that were 
oriented towards defeating known, identifiable threats, the new doctrine does not focus 
on any particular region of the world.  Instead, the new doctrine emphasizes the ability of 
the U.S. Navy to project its power anywhere it is needed in the world, against all types of 
potential enemies, and calls for a joint force structure.  According to the doctrine, naval 
forces will  
continue the evolution of U.S. naval power from the blue-water, war-at-
sea focus of the “Maritime Strategy”(1986) through the littoral 
emphasis of “… From the Sea” (1992) and “Forward …from the Sea” 
(1994), to a broadened strategy in which naval forces are fully 
integrated into global joint operations against regional and transnational 
dangers.79 
 
The Sea Power 21 doctrine has three principal cornerstones: Sea Strike, Sea 
Shield, and Sea Basing.  The Sea Strike portion of the doctrine focuses on power 
projection.  It includes precision weaponry, further integration into a joint warfighting 
architecture, and the introduction of new technologies into the fleet.  Sea Strike envisions 
using the advantage of the sovereign nature of naval forces to project power wherever it 
is needed, regardless of the willingness of other nations to provide support or to allow 
U.S. ground or air forces in their territories. 
Sea Shield is the defensive portion of the doctrine, and one of its primary focuses 
is the ability of naval forces to provide missile defense from the sea.  This is a change in 
the employment strategy of the defensive capability inherent in naval units. 
“Traditionally, naval defense has protected the unit, the fleet and sea lines of 
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communication.”  Sea Shield shifts this orientation “beyond unit and task-force defense 
to provide the nation with sea-based theater and strategic defense.”80  In an era in which 
land-based forward deployed U.S. forces are being drawn down, this new defense is 
expected to move the defense of Allies and the U.S. homeland into forward theaters. 
The third major pillar of the doctrine is Sea Basing. This pillar rests on the 
presumption that the world’s oceans provide huge areas in which to conduct operational 
maneuvers.  “As enemy access to weapons of mass destruction grows and the availability 
of overseas bases declines, it is compelling both militarily and politically to reduce the 
vulnerability of U.S. forces through expanded use of secure, mobile, networked sea 
bases.”81  The three pillars of the Sea Power 21 doctrine are clearly consistent with the 
strategic plan of the European Command as stated by its commander, General James 
Jones, USMC, to make the U.S. forces in Europe more expeditionary and less tethered to 
territorial defense. 
The Sea Shield portion of the doctrine deals with ballistic missile defense, a 
controversial issue in the relationship between the United States and its European Allies.  
These issues include liability for falling debris, technological feasibility, and the fact that 
“the European allies do not share the sense of an imminent missile threat felt by the 
United States – despite parts of southern Europe being already in range of ballistic 
missiles located in North Africa and the Middle East.”82  While the Clinton 
Administration was against the deployment of large-scale national missile defense 
systems, President George W. Bush has championed missile defense for the protection of 
the U.S. homeland since the 2000 presidential campaign. 
The desire of the Bush administration to create a missile defense system for the 
protection of the U.S. homeland created a split between the United States and its 
European Allies because of the concept of shared risk, and its impact on maintaining the 
security of NATO members in Europe.  
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There was anxiety that if the United States acquired some 
protection against missile attacks, but Europe remained 
vulnerable, this could undermine the concept of shared risk 
and America’s extended deterrence and security 
commitments to Europe, based for decades on the presence 
of U.S. forces and nuclear weapons on European soil.83 
 
This anxiety was assuaged when it became clear to the Allies that the United 
States supported the development and deployment of missile defenses for the protection 
of all NATO homelands.  In November 2002 at the Prague Summit the Allies decided to: 
Examine options for addressing the increasing missile 
threat to Alliance territory, forces and population centres in 
an effective and efficient way through an appropriate mix 
of political and defense efforts, along with deterrence.  
Today we initiated a new NATO Missile Defence 
feasibility study to examine options for protecting Alliance 
territory, forces and population centres against the full 
range of missile threats, which we will continue to 
assess.84 
 
In a period in which the United States is clearly drawing down its force structure 
on European soil, the deployment of a sea-based theater missile defense as envisioned in 
Sea Power 21 could help the United States maintain deterrence and defense for its Allies 
and interests in Europe. In the current security environment, in which the most immediate 
missile threat comes not from Russia, but from the Middle East and North Africa, the 
deployment of sea-based missile defenses could contribute to maintaining U.S. security 
commitments in a dynamic threat environment. 
Between 1999 and 2003, the U.S. Navy was an extremely active forward 
deployed force that continued to move its emphasis away from Europe and the 
Mediterranean and towards the Middle East and Asia.  The leadership of both the 
Secretary of Defense and the European Command Combatant Commander reinforced the 
dedication to the desired transformation of American military forces to a joint and 
expeditionary posture capable of worldwide reach.  The European members of NATO 
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have recognized this shift in U.S. global military doctrine, and they are reshaping their 




























Between 1986 and 2003, the U.S. Navy adapted and evolved in its role as an 
instrument of securing U.S. interests in Europe, leading to changes in both force structure 
and doctrine.  This thesis concludes that four factors appear to have been the main 
determinants of these changes: (1) geopolitics, including changes in the political and 
security environment in Europe; (2) inter-service competition for resources, influenced 
by congressionally mandated jointness in military operations; (3) the influence of key 
policy-makers in the United States political and military command structure, including 
the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, and elected officials of both the executive and 
the legislative branches; and (4) relations between the United States and its NATO Allies.   
Three periods are analyzed in this thesis.  The first period, 1986 to 1995, includes 
the end of the Cold War, the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and significant 
changes in the resources devoted by the United States to defense, notably in Europe.  The 
second period, 1995-1999, included more substantial force structure changes, and 
Operation Allied Force, NATO’s first large-scale combat operation.  The third period, 
1999-2003, included unprecedented cooperation between the NATO Allies, major shifts 
in doctrine and force structure towards increased jointness, and forces more capable of 
expeditionary operations.  The 1999-2003 period included a major geopolitical change in 
which the major threat to security became terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and their means of delivery, including ballistic missile threats from 
outside the Euro-Atlantic region.  During each period certain determinants were more 
influential than others, but all contributed to shaping doctrine and force structure. 
During the 1986-1995 period, the end of the Cold War led to inter-service 
competition for dwindling defense resources.  The U.S. Navy’s doctrine at the beginning 
of the period, the Maritime Strategy, was designed to defeat the Soviet Union in the event 
of war; and it was a strategy specific to naval warfare, with scant attention paid to joint 
operations.  In 1992, the U.S. Navy published a new doctrine, From the Sea, and began to 
shift its emphasis from open-ocean operations to projecting power ashore.  By the end of 
the period, the U.S. military presence in Europe had been reduced by over two-thirds, and 
the Middle East had become the focal point of a larger percentage of U.S. military 
operations. The jointness congressionally mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and 
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decisions by the military and political leadership of the United States also led to changes 
in the role of the U.S. Navy in European security. 
Two major military actions in the Balkans, Operation Deliberate Force (August-
September 1995) and Operation Allied Force (March-June 1999) temporarily transferred 
the emphasis of U.S. naval forces back towards the Euro-Atlantic region, but even in the 
midst of combat operations, controversy over the allocation of U.S. military capabilities 
between Europe and other regions persisted.  Terrorist attacks against two U.S. embassies 
in Africa in 1998, the continuing threat posed by the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, and 
a growing nuclear threat from North Korea led the United States to deploy a large 
percentage of its naval forces away from Europe.  In 1997, the U.S. Navy built upon 
From the Sea with a new doctrine, Forward From the Sea, which placed even greater 
emphasis on joint operations than its predecessor.  The unwillingness of the Clinton 
Administration to commit ground forces to operations in non-permissive environments 
resulted in an increased emphasis on naval and air forces to carry out combat operations.  
That policy, combined with the lessons of Operation Desert Storm and the operations in 
the Balkans, resulted in increased jointness, especially between the U.S. Navy and U.S. 
Air Force. 
The conclusion of combat in Operation Allied Force marked another shift in U.S. 
military strategy towards Europe.  No new major threats to Europe were foreseen in the 
near future.  Geopolitical events in the 1999-2003 period, notably the terrorist attacks on 
the United States on 11 September 2001, and the renewed threat posed by a nuclear-
armed North Korea once again shifted attention away from Europe towards the Middle 
East and Asia.  The terrorist attacks against the United States resulted in the first 
invocation in history of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and unprecedented 
cooperation between the NATO Allies followed. 
A visible sign of this cooperation was Operation Active Endeavor.  This operation 
included the deployment of a NATO naval task force to the eastern Mediterranean to 
show NATO solidarity and to maintain surveillance of suspect shipping in the 
Mediterranean.  In February 2003, the operation expanded to include the escort of Allied 
merchant ships through the Straits of Gibraltar.  As a result, the security provided to 
Europe by naval forces rests more with Allied units, freeing U.S. naval forces to conduct 
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operations against terrorism outside the Euro-Atlantic region.  Unfortunately, the 
unprecedented support provided to the United States in the war on terrorism was 
tempered by the attitudes of certain NATO Allies (Belgium, France and Germany) 
regarding the U.S.-led military campaign against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq in 
March-April 2003.   
In 2003, the U.S. Navy published a new doctrine, Sea Power 21.  The new 
doctrine does not focus on any particular geographic area, but instead emphasizes the 
ability of the U.S. Navy to contribute globally to joint operations, and to deal with 
regional and ballistic missile threats.  The importance of a shift towards more 
expeditionary force structures was also acknowledged by the NATO Alliance with the 
decision at the November 2002 Prague Summit to create the NATO Response Force.  
The selection for the first time of a U.S. Marine Corps officer to command the U.S. 
European Command is indicative of a shift towards an expeditionary force structure for 
the defense of U.S. interests in Europe and beyond, as permanently forward deployed 
ground forces in Europe are to be further reduced. 
Between 1986 and 2003, the U.S. Navy’s doctrine and force structure shifted 
from a Euro-centric Cold War posture designed for open-ocean operations towards a 
more balanced global-oriented force designed to deal with contingencies in any region of 
the world.  Moreover, the U.S. Navy’s doctrine changed from a service-oriented approach 
to a joint strategy.   Geopolitics, the inter-service competition for resources, the influence 
of key United States policy makers, and the relations between the United States and its 
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